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STAFF NOTES:


Soviet Union Eastern Europe

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
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

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USSR-Egypt: Treaty in Jeopardy?

Moscow seems concerned that the steady deterioration of its relations with Cairo could lead President Sadat to abrogate the Soviet-Egyptian treaty. So far, however, there is little sign that Moscow will try to head off this possibility by displaying more flexibility toward Cairo.

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Soviet unease about the treaty was also suggested in a major *Pravda* article on Soviet-Egyptian relations printed Tuesday. Although ostensibly aimed at recent Egyptian press attacks on the USSR, the article was clearly a response to continuing criticism from Sadat himself.

Pravda contended that Moscow is adhering to the spirit and letter of the friendship treaty. It rejected accusations that Moscow's arms agreements with Libya were made to spite Egypt and claimed that the USSR is continuing to "actively cooperate" with Egypt in defense matters. The article tried to portray Moscow as the injured party and, implicitly, accused Sadat of a "vicious intention" to undermine the Soviet position in Egypt and the Arab world. 25X1

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Although Sadat last month publicly hinted that he might talk to Moscow about the relevance of the treaty, we have seen no good evidence, however, that he is considering such direct action.

In view of the current state of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, Sadat probably would be hesitant to take a move that would have no more than propaganda value but in the event of another war could jeopardize the already uncertain supply of Soviet arms.

From the Soviet standpoint, the treaty is now a dead letter as far as any practical contribution to Soviet-Egyptian relations is concerned, but it continues to have considerable symbolic value. Its annulment would be a major setback to Soviet prestige and could foreshadow cancellation of Moscow's remaining port rights in Egypt.

Despite their apparent concern, the Soviets have made no move to patch up relations with Egypt. Instead, they seem intent on waiting out Sadat, and hoping that the pressures on him will bring about a change in Egyptian policy.

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Czechoslovak Repression Under Fire
from Italian Communist Party

Renewed tensions between the Czechoslovak and Italian Communist parties may create further problems in the already troubled preparations for a European conference of Communist parties. The bilateral squabble has never been far below the surface since the Husak regime came to power in 1969.

Unita, the Italian party's official organ, on Tuesday blasted Prague for mistreating "scores of its intellectuals" and charged the Husak leadership with violating "one of the foundations of socialist democracy"--freedom of culture. The move was ostensibly made in response to the "tragic letter" that Karel Kosik, a Marxist philosopher in Prague, sent to Jean Paul Sartre. Kosik's letter described the increased repression that has followed Husak's speech on April 16 condemning Dubcek and warning dissidents.

Kosik's letter was made available to Western news services in late May, when another commentary in *Unita* described the situation in Czechoslovakia as "extremely grave." The Italian party's decision to replay the Kosik letter and to increase polemics with Prague at this time may be tied to the preparations of a European party conference.

The Italian party has played a leading role in opposing Soviet attempts to formulate a binding program, and several sessions of the drafting commission in East Berlin have thus far failed to hammer out documents acceptable to all parties.

Meanwhile, the Italian party denies that it has received a letter from Dubcek reportedly requesting that the issue of Prague's repression be

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placed on the conference agenda.

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Changes Noted in Local Party Organizations

Changes in Soviet personnel at the first and second secretary level of local party organizations continue. [redacted] the rate of local shifts has neither decreased nor increased significantly since our last report [redacted]

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[redacted] The following shifts have occurred:

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RSFSR:

June 25: Fedor Petrovich Burmistrov, 1st secretary of Karachayevo-Cherkessk Oblast, was transferred to other work, and was replaced by V. S. Murakhovsky (formerly secretary of the Stavropol Kraykom).

July 11: Vitaly Ivanovich Vorotnikov, 1st secretary of Voronezh Oblast, was named 1st deputy chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers, and was replaced by Vadim Nikolayevich Ignatov (formerly 2nd secretary of Leningrad Obkom).

Tadzhikistan:

April 24: Aleksandr Ivanovich Shitov, 2nd secretary of Tadzhikistan, was replaced by Yury Ivanovich Polukarov (formerly a sector head in the CC, CPSU Organizational-Party Work Department). On May 13, Shitov, who is a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, was appointed 1st deputy chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee.

Ukraine:

April 23: Aleksandr Ivanovich Ishchenko, 1st secretary of Sumy Oblast, was relieved under criticism and replaced by Ivan Grigoryevich Grintsov (formerly secretary of Donetsk Obkom).

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Uzbek:

May 13: Ivan Petrovich Dryzhak, 2nd secretary of Khorezm Oblast, was transferred to other work and was replaced three days later by Boris Anatolyvich Novitsky (formerly 2nd secretary of the Kara-Kalpak Obkom).

May 16: V. V. Kislov was named to replace Novitsky as 2nd secretary of Kara-Kalpak ASSR.

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